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CRIMINALIZATION AND NORMALIZATION: SOME THOUGHTS 
ABOUT OFFENDERS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 
Richard C. Boldt* 
A great many people caught up in the criminal legal system have 
mental illness or other mental disabilities. Inmates in jails and prisons in 
the United States suffer from serious mental illness—defined as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depressive disorder—at two to 
three times the rate found in the population generally.1 In response, many 
jurisdictions have adopted specialized programs designed to reduce 
reoffending through the provision of mental health treatment services.2 
These interventions, including mental health courts, specialized 
probation and parole programs, reentry  programs and the like, all take as 
given that serious mental illness either causes criminal conduct or places 
individuals at risk of arrest and seek to prevent such reoffending by 
providing treatment designed to interrupt or ameliorate an underlying 
mental disability.3 This intuition regarding causation, and these allied 
specialized programs, are the target of Professor E. Lea Johnston’s recent 
article, Reconceptualizing Criminal Justice Reform for Offenders with 
Serious Mental Illness.4 Professor Johnston’s careful analysis 
systematically unpacks the premises that ground this understanding, 
which she terms the “criminalization” theory, and demonstrates that they 
are “often unverified and sometimes false.”5 Professor Johnston then 
offers an alternative account, the “normalization” theory, which explains 
that serious mental illness does not play a direct causal role in most 
instances of criminal conduct and emphasizes that offenders with mental 
illness and other mental disabilities become at risk for criminal system 
 
 * T. Carroll Brown Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. I 
thank Francis T. Cullen and E. Lea Johnston for their helpful comments on a draft of this response 
Essay. 
 1. Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: 
Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 110 (2011) 
[hereinafter Correctional Policy]; see Nahama Broner et al., Effects of Diversion on Adults with 
Co-Occurring Mental Illness and Substance Use: Outcomes from a National Multi-Site Study, 22 
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 519, 520 (2004); see also DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 3 
(2006) (comparing mental health disorder statistics between the general population and local, 
state, and federal jail and prison inmates).  
 2. See Correctional Policy, supra note 1, at 111.  
 3. See id. at 111–12. 
 4. E. Lea Johnston, Reconceptualizing Criminal Justice Reform for Offenders with Serious 
Mental Illness, 71 FLA. L. REV. 515, 521 (2019). 
 5. Id. at 515. 
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involvement for many of the same reasons as other offenders.6 
Professor Johnston argues that adhering to the criminalization model 
produces significant negative consequences.7 First, it reinforces harmful 
stigma by depicting individuals with mental illness as especially prone to 
criminality, violence, or both.8 In addition, it supports interventions that 
draw limited resources that could be directed more usefully to addressing 
other needs of offenders that demonstrably do cause criminal conduct.9  
To be sure, the normalization theory acknowledges that serious mental 
illness often leads individuals to accumulate more, and more intense, risk 
factors of the sort that contribute to criminal system involvement,10 but 
Professor Johnston’s conclusion is that rehabilitative interventions should 
focus primarily on those “criminogenic risk factors” rather than the 
clinical or treatment needs of offenders with severe mental illness.11 
While Professor Johnston is persuasive that clinical factors such as 
diagnosis and treatment history are not, in most cases, predictive by 
themselves of criminal behavior, her concession that those clinical factors 
are associated with a constellation of risks and needs that are predictive 
of criminal system involvement complicates her efforts to maintain a 
clear boundary between the criminalization theory and the normalization 
thesis. Indeed, Professor Johnston’s article contains a brief section in 
which she identifies “possible justifications” for the specialized programs 
that are the target of her critique.12 These justifications deserve more 
attention, precisely because they suggest that the normalization thesis, 
while powerful, may not entirely displace the criminalization theory upon 
which those specialized programs rest. Moreover, even if the 
criminalization theory and the normalization theory are at least partially 
reconcilable, important questions remain regarding the proper allocation 
of limited resources both within the criminal legal system and the public 
mental health system. These questions, in turn, press focus on additional 
questions with respect to the underlying purposes of criminal system 
 
 6. See id. at 536–39; see also Nancy Wolff, Are Mental Health Courts Target Efficient?, 
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY, Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 67, 68 (noting that “offenders with mental illness 
are ‘normal’ in their criminal behavior insofar as the same criminogenic risk factors that motivate 
offenders without mental illness also motivate those with mental illness”); Correctional Policy, 
supra note 1, at 116–17 (noting that alternatives to the criminalization hypothesis assume that the 
causes of criminal behavior are largely shared by offenders with and without mental illness).  
 7. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 521. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 521, 523. 
 10. Cf. Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Offenders with Mental Illness Have Criminogenic Needs, 
Too: Toward Recidivism Reduction, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 212, 218–19, 221–22 (2014) 
[hereinafter Toward Recidivism Reduction] (finding an indirect relationship between mental 
illness and recidivism). 
 11. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 538–39. 
 12. See id. at 554–58. 
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coercion more generally.  
The complex associations between serious mental illness and several 
of the key risk factors for criminal system involvement—most notably 
substance misuse—impact the design of effective programs intended to 
reduce reoffending. Given the practical difficulty of disentangling the 
treatment of mental disabilities from the provision of effective 
interventions to interrupt patterns of criminal behavior in offenders who 
have significant mental illness, some specialized attention to clinical 
mental health needs is warranted in correctional rehabilitation programs. 
These integrated programs are resource intensive, however, and should 
be reserved for offenders with serious mental illness who present the 
highest risk of reoffending. Others, who are lower risk, are strong 
candidates for diversion from the criminal system altogether, assuming 
that appropriate services in the community can be made available on a 
consistent basis. 
I.  CRIMINALIZATION THEORY 
Central to the criminalization theory is the notion of 
transinstitutionalization, which holds that when states reduced the 
availability of psychiatric beds in state hospitals beginning in the 1960s 
and 1970s, displaced patients were forced into the community without 
adequate treatment and other essential services and therefore were drawn 
into jails and prisons, which became “de facto treatment facilities.”13 
From this perspective, it is untreated, or undertreated, mental illness that 
accounts for much of the criminal system involvement of individuals with 
serious mental illness.14  
 
 13. Seth J. Prins, Does Transinstitutionalization Explain the Overrepresentation of People 
with Serious Mental Illnesses in the Criminal Justice System?, 47 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 716, 
716–17 (2011).  
 14. Id. at 718. The criminalization theory has several constituent elements. First is the idea 
that “a constant segment of the mentally ill population will always require institutional care.” 
Justin L. Joffe, Don’t Call Me Crazy: A Survey of America's Mental Health System, 91 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1145, 1156 (2016) (footnote omitted). This notion can be traced to Lionel Penrose’s 1939 
article, Mental Disease and Crime: Outline of a Comparative Study of European Statistics, which 
argued that “[t]he population of every land may be presumed to contain a small section composed 
of people whose behaviour is so undesirable from the social point of view that they require 
segregation for a greater or lesser period of their lives” either through criminal confinement or by 
way of civil commitment. L. S. Penrose, Mental Disease and Crime: Outline of a Comparative 
Study of European Statistics, 18 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 1, 1–15 (1939). The second element is an 
assumed “reciprocity and functional interdependence between the mental health and criminal 
justice systems whereby a decrease in capacity in one results in the expanded use of the other for 
individuals requiring institutional care.” Johnston, supra note 4, at 525. Taken together, these 
elements lead to the conclusion that a limited supply of inpatient beds in state hospitals and the 
application of libertarian rules that narrowed the scope of the state’s civil commitment power 
resulted in more undertreated individuals being held in jails and prisons that “in effect, serve the 
role of psychiatric inpatient services.” Prins, supra note 13, at 718. 
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Professor Johnston carefully goes through evidence that calls this 
account into question, demonstrating it to be reductionist in that it 
“mistakenly draw[s] a causal connection between two merely correlated 
trends: the decline in the availability of state psychiatric hospital beds and 
the rise in prevalence of [serious mental illness] in jails and prisons.”15 
First, many offenders with serious mental illness would not have been 
treated as inpatients in state hospitals even before deinstitutionalization.16 
Compared to offenders with severe mental illness currently in jails and 
prisons, patients in state hospitals prior to deinstitutionalization were 
more likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia, were older, and were less 
likely to be African American or Latinx.17 In addition, the percentage of 
incarcerated offenders in the United States who have serious mental 
illness, as distinguished from the absolute number of such inmates, has 
not increased dramatically in recent decades.18 Instead, the increased 
number of inmates with serious mental illness seems to be a function of 
the overall increase in incarceration rates due to the war on drugs and 
other tough on crime policies implemented in the last quarter of the 20th 
century.19  Finally, the idea that most of the persons who formerly would 
have been treated as long-term inpatients in state hospitals now live in 
unstructured settings in the community where they are at risk of criminal 
system involvement, or are homeless, is inconsistent with evidence that 
many in this group are cared for in nursing homes and other specialized 
housing where they are “still institutionalized, not in their communities 
unsuccessfully attempting to access treatment for behaviors that might 
draw the attention of law enforcement officers.”20 
Another element of the criminalization theory centers on “differential 
policing,” or the idea “that—in light of a lack of community treatment 
options, bureaucratic hurdles to emergency hospitalization, and narrow 
civil commitment criteria—officers may opt to arrest individuals with 
mental illness for minor offenses as a means of securing treatment, an act 
that has been called ‘mercy booking.’”21 While there are some 
 
 15. Prins, supra note 13, at 720; see Johnston, supra note 4, at 526–30. 
 16. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 528; Prins, supra note 13, at 719. 
 17. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 528; Prins, supra note 13, at 719. 
 18. See Prins, supra note 13, at 719. 
 19. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 529. On the increase in rates of incarceration and the 
impact of the war on drugs on jail and prison populations in the United States, see generally 
Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261 (2010) [hereinafter Drug Policy in Context].  
 20. See Richard C. Boldt, Emergency Detention and Involuntary Hospitalization: Assessing 
the Front End of the Civil Commitment Process, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2017) [hereinafter 
Emergency Detention] (quoting Prins, supra note 13, at 719). 
 21. Johnston, supra note 4, at 530. The high rate of homelessness among people with 
serious mental illness is also part of this narrative. “[T]he mere fact of living on the street can 
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observational studies that appear to confirm this idea,22 Professor 
Johnston identifies other research that, after controlling for “legally 
relevant and encounter-level factors,” finds persons with mental illness 
are no more likely to be arrested than others who encounter the police.23 
Indeed, there is even some data to suggest that those with mental illness 
are arrested less often in circumstances that would have led to the arrest 
of others.24 
The final element of the criminalization theory centers on the idea that 
criminal conduct often is the “manifestation” of serious mental illness.25 
A corollary to this intuition is the proposition that effective mental health 
treatment can reliably interrupt the cycle of criminal system involvement 
experienced by offenders with mental illness.26 Here, as in her prior work, 
Professor Johnston effectively explains that most criminal conduct 
exhibited by those with serious mental illness is not “symptom-driven,” 
and therefore is not, properly speaking, a manifestation of their mental 
disabilities.27 A small fraction of crimes committed by such individuals 
likely are the result of their delusions or hallucinations, and an equally 
small number are the result of anger, impulsivity, or confusion stemming 
from mental illness, but overall “for offenders, having a mental disorder 
was no more predictive of recidivism than not having a mental 
disorder.”28 
 
result in a series of arrests for nuisance behaviors that may cumulatively result in prison 
sentences.” Jennifer S. Bard, How the 21st Century Cures Act Can Mitigate the Ever Growing 
Problem of Mass Incarceration, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 391 (2018). In addition, “because people 
with mental illness may not respond quickly to instructions or behave as instructed, small 
incidents can escalate into major confrontations.” Id. at 388. 
 22. See Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of 
the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCH. 794, 798–99 (1984).   
 23. Johnston, supra note 4, at 531. 
 24. See id. at 531–32. 
 25. Id. at 532. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 532–35; see also E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 519, 560–61 (2012). Professor Johnston stated that 
 
[M]ental illnesses may directly contribute to the criminality of only about 10 
percent of the mentally disordered offending population . . . . [F]or the 
remaining 90 percent of offenders with mental illnesses, the effect of mental 
illness on criminal activity is fully mediated by factors such as poverty or 




 28. Johnston, supra note 4, at 533, 535. 
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II.  NORMALIZATION THEORY AND THE RNR MODEL 
In contrast to the criminalization theory, which regards offenders with 
serious mental illness as distinguished primarily by their disabilities, the 
normalization theory is based on the premise that “offenders with mental 
illness are ‘normal’ in their criminal behavior insofar as the same 
criminogenic risk factors that motivate offenders without mental illness 
also motivate those with mental illness.”29 Adoption of this alternative 
framing leads, in turn, to a different approach to organizing rehabilitative 
services for offenders in general and for offenders with serious mental 
illness particularly.30 Instead of concentrating treatment resources within 
the criminal legal system in specialized programs designed to address the 
clinical needs of mentally disabled offenders, the normalization theory 
urges the allocation of rehabilitative interventions based on the level of 
risk associated with the criminogenic needs of individuals in the system.31 
As psychologist Donald A. Andrews and James Bonta, two leading 
proponents of this model, explain: 
Offenders . . . have a right to the highest quality service for 
other needs, but that is not the focus of correctional 
rehabilitation. Striving to change noncriminogenic needs is 
unlikely to alter future recidivism significantly unless it 
indirectly impacts on a criminogenic need. We may help an 
offender feel better, which is important and valued, but this 
may not necessarily reduce recidivism.32 
The framework for operationalizing this approach is the widely 
accepted Risk-Need-Responsivity Model (RNR).33 This model, which 
 
 29. Id. at 536. 
 30. See id. at 538–39. 
 31. See id. at 538–40. 
 32. D. A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 244 (2d ed. 
1998) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT].  
 33. The RNR Model is considered the “dominant paradigm for working with offenders.” 
CTR. FOR JUST. INNOVATION, PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: AN EVIDENCE REVIEW 4 (2015). The 
model has, however, received important criticism from advocates of the Good Lives Model. The 
Good Lives critique is that  
[The] RNR promotes prosocial behavior only insofar as it functions to reduce 
criminal behavior, whereas the GLM promotes prosocial behavior both that has 
the possibility to reduce criminal behavior and that provides the individual with 
an opportunity to live a satisfying life, the latter with which the RNR does not 
concern itself. The GLM, therefore, acknowledges intrinsic motivation for 
behavior and goes beyond viewing the person as the passive recipient of 
behavioral contingencies, while also acknowledging the influence of these 
contingencies on criminal behavior.   
Tony Ward et al., The Good Lives Model and the Risk Need Responsivity Model: A Critical 
Response to Andrews, Bonta, and Wormith, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 94, 101 (2012). 
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was developed in the early 1990s, is comprised of the principles of risk, 
need, and responsivity.34 The risk principle asserts that the intensity of a 
criminal system intervention intended to diminish recidivism should be 
matched to an offender’s level of risk.35 To accomplish this risk 
matching, proponents of the RNR model encourage the use of empirically 
validated risk assessment tools that measure both static risk factors, such 
as age and criminal history, and dynamic risk factors.36 The need 
principle states that treatment to reduce recidivism should target the 
particular set of criminogenic needs presented by a given offender.37 The 
focus here is on “addressing an offender’s set of dynamic criminogenic 
needs—those psycho-social-biological factors proven to influence and 
maintain criminal behavior—as opposed to focusing on other needs that 
are more distally related to offending.”38 The responsivity principle 
requires that interventions be designed to take into account the 
characteristics of individual offenders that are most likely to undermine 
their engagement with (and success in) rehabilitative programs.39 
Treatments based on cognitive social learning methods are thought to be 
the most effective at reducing criminal conduct,40 and “intervention 
strategies tailored to match the offender's individual learning styles, 
motivations, and abilities (e.g., physical disabilities, mental health, level 
 
 34. See D. A. Andrews et al., Classification for Effective Rehabilitation: Rediscovering 
Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 19–20 (1990). 
        35.   Id. at 20. Indeed, there is some evidence that requiring high intensity interventions 
may increase reoffending in low risk offenders. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 540–41.  
 36. See JAMES BONTA & D. A. ANDREWS, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL FOR OFFENDER 
ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION 5, 9 (2007) [hereinafter RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL]. 
There is considerable debate concerning the increasing reliance by corrections officials on risk 
assessment tools. Some writers have raised concerns about the inadequate cross-validation of 
some risk assessment tools, while others note low levels of inter-rater reliability. See, e.g., Donna 
Cropp Bechman, Sex Offender Civil Commitments: Scientists or Psychics?, CRIM. JUST., Summer 
2001, at 24, 28–29; Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Do PCL-R Scores from State or Defense Experts 
Best Predict Future Misconduct Among Civilly Committed Sex Offenders?, 36 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 159, 167–68 (2012).  
 37. Andrews et al., supra note 34, at 20.  
 38. Johnston, supra note 4, at 541; see Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in ACAD. 
FOR JUST., REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 291–92 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) [hereinafter Problem-
Solving Courts] (“Thus, instead of focusing solely on drug use treatment for persons with drug 
problems or medication management for offenders with mental illness, the need principle calls 
for the delivery of an integrated suite of services designed to meet all (or at least most) of the 
deficits that collectively contribute to their criminal involvement.”); see also Mary Ann Campbell 
et al., Multidimensional Evaluation of A Mental Health Court: Adherence to the Risk-Need-
Responsivity Model, 39 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 489, 490–91 (2015) (noting that in the mental health 
court context, the RNR model supports a case management plan that emphasizes the importance 
of treating criminogenic needs directly tied to criminal behavior in conjunction with mental health 
specific interventions). 
 39. Andrews et al., supra note 34, at 20.  
 40. See Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, CRIME & JUST., Aug. 
2013, at 299, 341–43.  
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of intelligence) are encouraged.”41  
Professor Johnston reports that a “groundswell is building to apply the 
RNR model to offenders with serious mental illness.”42 “[F]ederal 
agencies, policy advocates, and social scientists” are coming to 
agreement that the model should govern the allocation of rehabilitative 
resources within the criminal legal system.43 However, notwithstanding 
this developing consensus, little of the treatment currently offered to 
offenders with serious mental illness in specialty programs in fact 
“coheres with the RNR model.”44 Instead, so called first-generation 
treatment programs like mental health courts are still based on the 
criminalization model.45 Apparently, an “uncritical stance” seems to have 
led many decision makers within the criminal legal system to continue 
supporting plainly inefficient programs.46 This mismatch between theory 
and practice may be the result of officials’ stubborn refusal to engage the 
best evidence available on criminal system rehabilitation, or it could be a 
product of the sort of policy inertia that often attends paradigm-level 
shifts in governing models.47 But the various justifications, identified by 
Professor Johnston, for the continued support of first-generation specialty 
programs likely is doing much of this work. These justifications, 
therefore, warrant more focused attention. 
III.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF SPECIALIZED MENTAL 
HEALTH TREATMENT INTERVENTIONS 
The first justification regards serious mental illness as an appropriate 
target of treatment in criminal system-located rehabilitation programs 
because these disabilities stand as an obstacle impeding the effectiveness 
of measures intended to redress criminogenic needs.48 On this account, 
specialized programs to treat offenders’ mental illness are warranted, 
even if mental illness is not independently predictive of reoffending, 
when the recipients of those services suffer from particularly severe 
disorders that require clinical intervention before other measures to 
address criminogenic needs can be implemented.49 This justification is 
not limited to circumstances in which offenders are so decompensated 
that they are unable to engage with rehabilitative services; rather, it 
 
 41. Problem-Solving Courts, supra note 38, at 292; see also Johnston, supra note 4, at 541–
42 (distinguishing general and specific responsivity). 
 42. Johnston, supra note 4, at 545. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 548. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 549–50. 
 47. See id.  
 48. See id. at 554.  
 49. See id. at 554–55. 
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subsumes the greater universe of offenders whose “mental illness 
functions as a moderator of intervention effectiveness, such that 
successfully addressing the mental illness increases the effectiveness of 
interventions targeting criminogenic needs.”50 
The second justification for specialized mental health treatment is 
related to the first but does not impose a sequential logic on the 
relationship between mental illness and the effective treatment of 
criminogenic needs, and does not require that treatment for mental illness 
precede other rehabilitative interventions.51 Instead, this justification 
contemplates that mental illness and criminogenic needs “may be 
reinforcing or even synergistic.”52 Thus, even if an offender’s mental 
illness is not the direct cause of her criminal system involvement, this 
justification suggests it might be so bound up with other dynamic risk 
factors that the effective targeting of the one requires careful and 
simultaneous attention to the other.53 
The third justification noted by Professor Johnston is derived from the 
very idea that rehabilitative treatment must be responsive to the particular 
characteristics of offenders, which is a central feature of the RNR 
model.54 Some responsivity factors, such as cultural or language barriers, 
are external to the individual recipient of services but still require 
attention if social and behavioral learning resources are to be effective in 
addressing criminogenic needs and risks.55 Others are internal, and may 
include barriers to rehabilitation that result from age, physical, or mental 
disability.56 These internal responsivity factors may produce anxiety, 
confusion, depression, or anger, and they—like external factors—must 
be addressed if an offender’s recidivism risk is to be reduced.57 On this 
logic, specialized mental health treatment may be appropriate given that 
“modifications to general correctional interventions may be necessary to 
address the particular treatment needs, cognitive and emotional 
impairments, and delivery requirements of offenders with serious mental 
illness.”58  
Taken together, these justifications unsettle the suggestion implied in 
 
 50. Id. at 555. 
 51. See id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Applicability of the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model to 
Persons with Mental Illness Involved in the Criminal Justice System, 66 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 916, 
920 (2015) [hereinafter Applicability of the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model].  
 54. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 557–58. 
 55. See id. at 542. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id.; see also Jan Looman et al., Responsivity Issues in the Treatment of Sexual 
Offenders, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 330, 345 (2005) (discussing various internal 
responsivity factors). 
 58. Johnston, supra note 4, at 558. 
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the unamended normalization thesis that offenders with serious mental 
illness are like other offenders in their relationship to criminogenic need 
and risk.59 For the reasons that Professor Johnston suggests, these 
justifications do not provide a sufficient basis for specialized first-
generation programs like mental health courts that prioritize the treatment 
of mental illness to the exclusion of other services designed to mitigate 
criminogenic risk factors,60 but they may provide good reasons for “next 
generation” specialty programs that thoughtfully integrate mental health 
treatment into a coordinated suite of interventions that are guided by the 
principles of the RNR model.61  
This is the case particularly with respect to mentally ill offenders who 
misuse alcohol or other drugs. One of the “Central Eight” criminogenic 
risk factors is substance misuse, which frequently is a co-occurring 
disorder with serious mental illness.62 Well-established RNR principles 
call for the application of treatment resources to manage or ameliorate 
substance use disorders (SUD) as part of a rehabilitative program 
addressing offenders’ criminogenic needs.63 If, however, the relationship 
between serious mental illness and SUD is such that the success of 
substance use treatment is contingent on the provision of other treatment 
for co-occurring mental illness, then it might be sensible to invest in the 
resources needed to effectively treat both of these linked clinical needs, 
 
 59. See id. at 536. A final justification identified by Professor Johnston for specialized 
programs for offenders with serious mental illness follows from the observation that even though 
most criminal conduct committed by these offenders is not a direct manifestation of their illness, 
in a minority of cases it is. Id. at 558. One difficulty with implementing programing on this basis 
is that “symptom-based crimes do not cluster by person,” which makes it difficult to target mental 
health treatment precisely to those whose disabilities most likely directly cause reoffending. Id. 
Nevertheless, some number of criminal events apparently are the direct result of symptoms 
associated with serious mental illness and this would appear to support a vestigial form of the 
criminalization thesis. As a matter of policy development and implementation, though, no single 
uniform approach is likely to be effective or practical in addressing this subset of symptom-driven 
crime, given that there is such diversity among offenders with serious mental illness. As Professor 
Johnston points out: 
Serious mental illness is not a single conglomerate with a uniform set of features. 
Indeed, no single mental illness has stable or uniform aspects. Therefore, 
different mental illnesses may fall within the ambit of different justifications and 
may satisfy multiple justifications simultaneously or across time. To justify a 
specialized criminal justice program, it may be unnecessary to scientifically 
verify a particular justification for a particular diagnosis or set of individuals.  
Johnston, supra note 4, at 559 (footnote omitted). 
 60. See id. at 551. 
 61. Id. at 559–60. 
 62. Id. at 536; see also Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Standardized Assessment of Substance-
Related, Other Psychiatric, and Comorbid Disorders Among Probationers, 47 INT’L J. OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY 630, 644 (2003). 
 63. Johnston, supra note 4, at 529, 544–45. 
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either in sequence or simultaneously.64 
Professor Johnston adopts a somewhat skeptical position on 
specialized programs that prioritize mental health treatment to facilitate 
the delivery of other rehabilitative services, noting the limited research 
data on mental illness as a “specific responsivity” factor.65 Discussing 
important work by clinical psychologist Sarah McCormick and her 
colleagues, Professor Johnston concludes that  
 
it is currently unclear how—and whether—mental illness 
may function in this way, either by allowing for the 
identification and treatment of more criminogenic needs 
or by increasing that treatment’s effectiveness at reducing 
recidivism. As of yet, there is no evidence to support the 
latter hypothesis, and only nascent evidence to support the 
former.66  
 
At least with respect to programs designed for offenders who have 
both mental illness and substance use disorders, however, Professor 
Johnston may be imposing too demanding a standard. As noted, the 
frequent co-occurrence of substance use disorders in individuals with 
serious mental illness is well established.67 Although the etiology of this 
comorbidity is not well understood and is likely the result of different 
factors for different subgroups in this population,68 the prevalence and 
nature of this comorbidity support instituting programs targeting mental 
illness as one significant component in an integrated plan for addressing 
other criminogenic needs and risks, even if the evidence to support the 
“specific responsivity” hypothesis is thin.69  
IV.  THE COMORBIDITY OF SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS AND MENTAL 
ILLNESS 
The unamended normalization thesis leads to the conclusion that “[a] 
correctional system in accord with RNR principles would prioritize 
 
 64. See Applicability of the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model, supra note 53, at 920 (“When 
clinical factors potentiate general risk factors, they become part of the criminogenic story that 
should be assessed and targeted with services that are ‘wise’ to their interaction.”). 
 65. Johnston, supra note 4, at 543–44. 
 66. Id. at 555 (footnote omitted) (discussing Sarah McCormick et al., The Role of Mental 
Health and Specific Responsivity in Juvenile Justice Rehabilitation, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 
63 (2017)).  
 67. See supra note 62; see also JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.5 (roughly 75% of 
offenders in state prisons or local jails, and over 60% of offenders in federal prison, with mental 
disorder struggle with substance dependence or abuse). 
 68. See Kim T. Mueser et al., Dual Diagnosis: A Review of Etiological Theories, 23 
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 717, 717–18, 728 (1998). 
 69. Johnston, supra note 4, at 543–44.  
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treating the criminogenic needs of those offenders who are at the highest 
risk of reoffending, regardless of their noncriminogenic needs.”70 The 
subset of offenders with comorbid SUD and mental illness whose 
amenability to rehabilitative interventions is dependent on the effective 
management of their mental illness are not “normal” in this sense.71 They 
may fall into the group with the highest risk of reoffending precisely 
because of the complex combination of behavioral health problems they 
present and may require specialized mental health treatment even if their 
mental illness is not, taken in isolation, a criminogenic risk.72 
The relationships between the various categories of serious mental 
illness and co-occurring drug use disorders are difficult to describe, and 
the relative effectiveness of different clinical interventions are even more 
difficult to measure.73  As a general matter, there are four comorbidity 
models that seek to explain the extremely high levels of co-occurrence 
between serious mental illness and substance use disorders.74 First, the 
common factor model “posit[s] that high rates of comorbidity are the 
result of shared vulnerabilities to both disorders.”75 A second model 
views substance use disorders as secondary to serious mental illness.76 
Individuals with serious mental illness may be vulnerable to developing 
a secondary SUD because of psychosocial risk factors, a need to self-
medicate against the effects of mental illness, or because serious mental 
illness creates a “supersensitivity” to various substances of abuse.77 
 
 70. Id. at 551 (emphasis added). Professor Johnston’s reliance on the RNR model and the 
normalization thesis supports the conclusion that treatment resources should be allocated to 
offenders at the highest risk of recidivism, whether or not they have psychiatric illness. While 
Professor Johnson does not insist that treatment plans disregard mental disorder, the weak 
empirical evidence with respect to mental illness as a specific responsivity factor presumably does 
impact her judgment with respect to the appropriate allocation of limited treatment resources. 
 71. Id. at 536.  
 72. See id. at 556–57. 
 73. On the complex and diverse mechanisms of association between serious mental illness 
and substance use disorders, see generally Mueser et al., supra note 68. On the comorbidity of 
depression and SUD, see Joel D. Swendsen & Kathleen R. Merikangas, The Comorbidity of 
Depression and Substance Use Disorders, 20 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 173 (2000). On the 
associations between, and implications for the treatment of, post-traumatic stress disorder and 
substance misuse, see Sherry H. Steward et al., Functional Associations Among Trauma, PTSD, 
and Substance-Related Disorders, 23 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 717 (1998). 
 74. See Mueser et al., supra note 68, at 718. Researchers in this field believe that different 
mechanisms of comorbidity may explain the dual diagnosis of different groups of patients, and 
more than one model may apply to any given individual. See id. at 718–19. 
 75. Id. at 719. These shared vulnerabilities could be genetic or they could derive from 
personality disorders or socioeconomic conditions. Id. at 719–21.  
 76. Mueser et al., supra note 68, at 722.   
 77. Id. at 722–24. While there is insufficient evidence to support the self-medication thesis, 
the supersensitivity theory may well account for a fair amount of the overlap between these 
disorders. “The research reviewed provides support for the hypothesis that patients with [serious 
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Alternatively, a third model suggests that mental illness may be 
secondary to sustained substance misuse. This possibility is based on a 
well-established model “in which psychobiological vulnerability to 
schizophrenia (or bipolar disorder) may be triggered by a stressor (in this 
case, a biological stressor in the form of drug abuse), resulting in the 
psychiatric syndrome.”78 A final bidirectional model suggests that 
“ongoing, interactional effects” between serious mental illness and 
substance use disorders help to explain the high rates of comorbidity.79 
Under this model, either disorder could play a role in triggering 
vulnerabilities that lead to the development of the other, and each then 
works to sustain their ongoing co-occurrence.80  
Whatever the precise mechanism that accounts for the high rate of 
comorbidity between any given mental illness and substance misuse, and 
whatever its etiology, the complexity and heterogeneity of the problem 
make it unlikely that a clear empirically demonstrated causal account can 
be developed through ordinary research methods.81  It is one thing to 
show the limited causal impact of serious mental illness when other 
criminogenic factors are controlled for; it is quite another to consider its 
impact in a dynamic system in which substance misuse and mental illness 
so frequently are intertwined. Professor Johnston acknowledges this 
practical difficulty, noting that  
establishing the scientific validity of some of these 
justifications—particularly those involving mental illness as 
a responsivity factor—in isolation would be very difficult 
given pragmatic data availability and clinical control 
feasibility. This is especially the case considering that 
serious mental illness and criminogenic risk factors, if they 
are related, may interact as part of an emergent system that 
does not lend itself to reductive efforts to test individual 
variables independently.82 
Recognizing these serious limitations in the research, it would seem a 
practical impossibility to disentangle the treatment of criminogenic 
 
mental illness] are prone to experience negative consequences from lower amounts of substance 
use than people in the general population, which could explain at least some of the excess 
comorbidity.” Id. at 724. 
 78. Id. at 727. “Once triggered, a drug-induced schizophreniform psychosis may be 
indistinguishable from a similar disorder either brought on by a socioenvironmental stressor or 
due to a sufficient amount of biological vulnerability.” Id. 
 79. Id.   
 80. See id.  
 81. On the difficulties of studying causation in the context of a comorbid mental illness and 
SUD, see Howard D. Chilcoat & Naomi Breslau, Investigations of Causal Pathways Between 
PTSD and Drug Disorders, 23 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 827 (1998). 
 82. Johnston, supra note 4, at 559 (footnote omitted). 
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substance misuse from the treatment of co-occurring serious mental 
illness in the many offenders who suffer from both. This practical reality 
has led Professor Jennifer Skeem and her colleagues to suggest that, 
because “the noncriminogenic risk factor of mental illness may both 
attract and exaggerate the effect of the criminogenic risk factor of 
substance abuse[,]” the treatment of serious mental illness may be an 
appropriate component of an RNR-informed system.83 
An approach that places the treatment of substance misuse at the 
center of the constellation of appropriate correctional rehabilitative 
services but rules treatment for mental illness to be of marginal 
importance is suspect for yet another reason. Much of the logic that 
supports moving mental health treatment out of specialized criminal 
system rehabilitation programs also supports moving specialized 
substance use treatment into the community as well. The long history of 
drug regulation in the United States, from the early 20th century through 
the war on drugs at the end of the last century to the present moment, 
teaches that substance misuse, like mental illness, is primarily a public 
health problem better addressed by health officials and not in the first 
instance by the criminal legal system.84 In addition, the risk component 
of the RNR model, as applied to offenders with behavioral health 
problems, directs that only high risk offenders should receive intensive 
correctional services.85 On this understanding, broadly including 
substance misuse as a criminogenic risk of interest while categorizing 
mental illness as orthogonal to the concerns of the RNR model is 
problematic. Such a differentiated understanding of mental illness versus 
SUD may reflect their relative causal contributions to the risk of 
reoffending when evaluated in the abstract and through regression 
analysis. But in the real world, given the complex and intensive 
comorbidity of these behavioral health disorders, an approach that 
integrates mental health treatment into a full range of rehabilitative 
services and then reserves this intensive treatment for only the highest 
 
 83. Id. at 557 (footnote omitted). Professor Skeem and colleagues point out that a “reason 
to avoid focusing services too exclusively on general risk factors is that these variables may 
sometimes interact with mental illness to exponentially increase risk.” Skeem et al., supra note 
53, at 920. 
The risk component of the RNR model encourages decisions about rehabilitative 
programming to be made on the basis of individualized risk assessments. It may be possible to 
identify the subset of offenders who, because of their co-occurring serious mental illness and 
SUD, are at high risk of recidivism and to direct resources to those offenders in particular, but the 
demands for treatment resources both within the corrections system and in the community 
necessarily compete with the allocation of those services within the criminal system. In addition, 
the limitations of the risk assessment process itself, see supra note 36, make this a difficult basis 
for making resource triage decisions. 
 84. See Drug Policy in Context, supra note 19, at 269–309. 
 85. Johnston, supra note 4, at 560, 563. 
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risk offenders is a much more sensible use of limited resources.86  
V.  ASSESSING REHABILITATIVE GOALS OTHER THAN THE REDUCTION OF 
RECIDIVISM 
Some advocates for mental health courts and other specialized 
criminal system-based programs that prioritize the treatment of serious 
mental illness cite pragmatic grounds not tied directly to the reduction of 
criminal reoffending. This alternative argument draws on research 
suggesting that treatment programs reinforced by criminal system 
coercion can be effective in reducing other costs generated by untreated 
mental illness that are borne by emergency departments, other 
components of the public mental health system, and other elements of the 
social safety net.87 Similar arguments have been made in support of other 
specialty programs targeting offenders with behavioral health problems, 
including drug courts and other problem-solving courts.88  
A central question raised by this alternative ground is whether it is fair 
or wise to focus limited treatment resources on those who commit 
criminal offenses as opposed to others with serious mental illness not 
enmeshed in the criminal legal system. A ready response is that treatment 
programs reinforced by the threat of criminal law sanctions produce 
improved outcomes by linking offenders to treatment and increasing the 
likelihood that they will be retained long enough to receive a therapeutic 
dose.89  In the absence of clear evidence that this coerced treatment 
 
 86. In comments on a draft of this response essay, Professor Johnston noted:  
I am not certain we should assume a substantial proportion of those with 
comorbid SMI and SUD are at the highest risk of recidivism. Indeed, the RNR 
Simulation Tool, developed to assist justice agencies in better allocating 
treatment resources to reduce recidivism, recommends that only a small 
percentage (3% to 5%) of high-risk offenders in each correctional modality 
(prison, jail, community corrections) should receive treatment for substance 
abuse or mental disorders. (A much higher percentage of moderate-risk offenders 
is recommended for substance abuse or mental health treatment: 40% of 
moderate-risk prisoners, 31% of jail inmates, and 36% of those on community 
supervision.)[.] 
Letter from E. Lea Johnston, Rsch. Found. Professor, Univ. of Fla. Levin College of Law, to 
author (July 10, 2020) (on file with author). 
Given limited correctional resources and limited mental health treatment resources, 
specialized services for the treatment of substance misuse and mental illness should be restricted 
to only those offenders who are at the highest risk of reoffending.  
 87. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 565–66. 
 88. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 128–29 (2004). 
 89. See Douglas B. Marlowe, Integrating Substance Abuse Treatment and Criminal Justice 
Supervision, SCI. & PRAC. PERSPS., Aug. 2003, at 4, 5; see also Douglas M. Anglin & Yih-ing 
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advances the goal of reducing criminal recidivism, however, the use of 
criminal punishment as a therapeutic lever may well be inappropriate.90 
As a rule, having a need for substance use or mental health treatment 
should never be a sufficient reason for an individual’s entry into the 
criminal legal system, and the criminal system should never be the only 
or primary means of obtaining needed treatment.91  
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from Professor Johnston’s compelling analysis that the 
criminalization theory, on its own, is not a sufficient basis for the 
specialized treatment too often directed uncritically at offenders with 
serious mental illness. On the other hand, the prevalence and intensity of 
the comorbidity between substance use disorders and serious mental 
illness support next-generation programs that, consistent with the RNR 
model, include specialized mental health treatment services alongside 
treatment for SUD for high risk offenders. Professor Johnston notes that 
the commitment of significant treatment resources to first-generation 
specialty programs for offenders with mental illness may undermine the 
ability of officials responsible for the operation of jails and prisons to 
provide a minimally adequate level of mental health treatment, as 
required by statutory and constitutional standards governing access to 
health care.92 She clearly is correct in this assessment, but this logic 
 
Hser, Legal Coercion and Drug Abuse Treatment: Research Findings and Social Policy 
Implications, in HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 151–52 (James A. Inciardi 
ed., 1990). 
 90. In fact, “[a]ccording to one major study from the Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy . . . adult drug courts reported a reduction in recidivism of 8.7 percent . . . on par with 
reduction recorded by programs offering community-based drug treatment (8.3 percent).” DRUG 
POL’Y ALL., DRUG COURTS ARE NOT THE ANSWER: TOWARD A HEALTH-CENTERED APPROACH TO 
DRUG USE 11 (2011). Similar data call into question the relative effectiveness of mental health 
courts in reducing recidivism. See Evan M. Lowder et al., Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts 
in Reducing Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis, 69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 15, 15 (2018) (“Overall, a 
small effect of MHC participation on recidivism was noted, compared with traditional criminal 
processing. Findings suggest the need for research to identify additional sources of variability in 
the effectiveness of MHCs.”). But see Christine M. Sarteschi et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Mental Health Courts: A Quantitative Review, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 12, 18 (2011) (reporting evidence 
of some effectiveness of mental health courts in reducing recidivism). In the event that criminal 
system enforced treatment is deployed not primarily to reduce reoffending but instead to reduce 
other societal costs, one could rely on legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart’s notion that, if limited by 
an assessment of proportional desert, coercive interventions designed to serve other 
consequentialist goals are permissible as a moral matter. See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the 
Principles of Punishment, in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1–27 (1968). Hart’s 
focus, however, was on the consequentialist goal of deterrence, not other utilitarian aims removed 
from the prevention of future offending. Id. at 9. 
 91. Cf. DRUG POL’Y ALL., supra note 90, at 4 (setting out these principles as a component 
of a “health-centered approach” to drug use). 
 92. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 552–53. 
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applies to specialty programs for offenders with SUD as well, including 
drug courts and other specialized programs that seek to deploy the 
coercive authority of the criminal system to encourage offenders to 
engage treatment.  Therefore, for lower risk offenders with mental illness 
and for offenders with comorbid SUD, the wise allocation of scarce 
treatment resources requires that these behavioral health risks be dealt 
with primarily outside of the criminal legal system and independently of 
criminal system coercion.93  
 
 93. One promising approach to relocating behavioral health interventions outside of the 
criminal legal system is the Sequential Intercept Model, which “envisions a series of points of 
interception at which an intervention can be made to prevent individuals from entering or 
penetrating deeper into the criminal justice system.” See Mark R. Munetz & Patricia A. Griffin, 
Use of the Sequential Intercept Model as an Approach to Decriminalization of People With 
Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 544, 544 (2006). 
